According to & nbsp; it was a realistic strategy & nbsp; & mdash; solve the numerous internal problems of the USSR by joining the & nbsp; European political project.
“But & nbsp; Gorbachev didn't have enough cards for such a big game.” Although, in addition to the trump card in the & nbsp; form of Soviet nuclear weapons, it also had a trump card in the & nbsp; form of the Eastern Bloc & nbsp; & mdash; it is a very valuable asset that could be properly exchanged. Just for & nbsp; this not & nbsp; had to be pulled for & nbsp; for three to four years & raquo;, & nbsp; & mdash; said the political strategist.
Pavlovsky added that & nbsp; President of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin took advantage of Gorbachev's strategic weakness to strike.
“ Moreover, he & nbsp; did not & nbsp; offer the West any & nbsp; special course , different from & nbsp; Gorbachevsky, he & nbsp; just perfectly chose the moment. And & nbsp; Yeltsin's blow was enough to overthrow, together with & nbsp; Gorbachev, & nbsp; the Soviet Union & raquo;, & nbsp; & mdash; summed up Pavlovsky.
Earlier, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus in & nbsp; 1991 & mdash; 1994 Stanislav Shushkevich in a & nbsp; conversation with & nbsp; “ Lenta.ru '' stated that & nbsp; top officials and & nbsp; heads of government of the three union republics, who gathered in & nbsp; Belovezhskaya Pushcha on December 8, 1991, & nbsp; from the very beginning did not & nbsp; plan to make a decision on & nbsp; secession from & nbsp; USSR.